Belief, Truth and the Enigma of Error

What are the basic conditions for knowledge? What
are the prerequisites for understanding other human
beings? What are the conditions for emergence of
beliefs that can be true or false? Mariann Solberg
discusses problems related to the American
philosopher Donald Davidson's (1917-2003) views on
belief, truth and error. Solbergs takes Davidson's
thinking on these questions to be a version of
naturalized philosophy. The possibility of error is
a premise for a theory of linguistically formed
knowledge. The book inquires to what extent we
within the Davidsonian model of radical
interpretation can give an account of error. The
problem of explaining how error is possible has over
time come to seem close to an enigma. Davidson has
taken it that if we can explain error, we can
explain intentionality. An explanation of
intentionality would also be an explanation of the
phenomenon of normativity. A solution to the problem
of error would therefore be of great interest and
have rich consequences. On a metaphilosophical level
the analysis of Davidson s theory is employed to
test the potential of a naturalized philosophical
account of intentionality.

Autorentext

Mariann Solberg is assistant professor at The University's Centre for Flexible Education, University of Troms. Her research concentrates on philosophical naturalism. She has published on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, philosophy of science, and philosophy in the working life.