Collective Dominance in EC Competition Law: Role of Structural Links

One of the key objectives behind the ECMR (European
Communities Merger Regulation) is to prevent
concentration leading to creation or strengthening of
a dominant position which is prohibited by Article
2(3). However, the reference to single undertaking in
Article 2(3) of ECMR has raised a number of questions
as to the applicability of the concept of collective
dominance under the ECMR. Even where it is accepted
that the concept is applicable, uncertainties remain
as to the extent of applicability. Neither the
original rules on competition in the EC Treaty nor
the ECMR itself is clear enough to ascertain whether
behavioral or structural controls could be used to
prevent or regulate collective dominance in
oligopolistic markets.
One of the important questions in EC Competition Law
is whether the dominance by a group of undertakings
is the same as the dominance by a single firm. This
work attempts to clarify this issue by analyzing the
relevant EC case law. It analyses economic links
between the members of oligopoly in order to detect
potential collective dominant position that might be
significantly impeding the effective competition
within the Common Market.

Autorentext

Farid Bektashi has received his Master's degree in European
Business Administration and Business Law from Lund University.

Klappentext

One of the key objectives behind the ECMR (European
Communities Merger Regulation) is to prevent
concentration leading to creation or strengthening of
a dominant position which is prohibited by Article
2(3). However, the reference to single undertaking in
Article 2(3) of ECMR has raised a number of questions
as to the applicability of the concept of collective
dominance under the ECMR. Even where it is accepted
that the concept is applicable, uncertainties remain
as to the extent of applicability. Neither the
original rules on competition in the EC Treaty nor
the ECMR itself is clear enough to ascertain whether
behavioral or structural controls could be used to
prevent or regulate collective dominance in
oligopolistic markets.
One of the important questions in EC Competition Law
is whether the dominance by a group of undertakings
is the same as the dominance by a single firm. This
work attempts to clarify this issue by analyzing the
relevant EC case law. It analyses economic links
between the members of oligopoly in order to detect
potential collective dominant position that might be
significantly impeding the effective competition
within the Common Market.