A Materialist Theory of the Mind

A landmark of 20th century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist revolution in approaches to the mind and has been debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication in 1968. Includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey, placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical context.

D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is widely known as one of the most important defences of the view that mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain. A landmark of twentieth-century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist revolution in approaches to the mind and has been engaged with, debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication over fifty years ago.

Ranging over a remarkable number of topics, from behaviourism, the will and knowledge to perception, bodily sensation and introspection, Armstrong argues that mental states play a causally intermediate role between stimuli, other mental states and behavioural responses. He uses several illuminating examples to illustrate this, such as the classic case of pain.

This Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey, placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical context.

Autorentext

David Malet Armstrong was born in 1926 in Melbourne, Australia. He studied philosophy at the University of Sydney before going to Oxford, taking the recently established B. Phil. degree in 1954. He taught briefly at Birkbeck College, London, before returning to Australia to teach at the University of Melbourne. He succeeded J.L. Mackie in Anderson's chair at Sydney in 1964, where he taught until his retirement in 1991. He died in 2014.

Klappentext

D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is widely known as one of the most important defences of the view that mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain. A landmark of twentieth-century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist revolution in approaches to the mind and has been engaged with, debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication over fifty years ago. Ranging over a remarkable number of topics, from behaviourism, the will and knowledge to perception, bodily sensation and introspection, Armstrong argues that mental states play a causally intermediate role between stimuli, other mental states and behavioural responses. He uses several illuminating examples to illustrate this, such as the classic case of pain. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey, placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical context.

Inhalt

Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition Peter Anstey Acknowledgements Preface to the 1993 Edition Introduction Part 1: Theories of Mind 1. A Classification of Theories of Mind 2. Dualism 3. The Attribute Theory 4. A Difficulty for any Non-Materialist Theory of Mind 5. Behaviourism 6. The Central-State Theory Part 2: The Concept of Mind 7. The Will (1) 8. The Will (2) 9. Knowledge and Inference 10. Perception and Belief 11. Perception and Behaviour 12. The Secondary Qualities 13. Mental Images 14. Bodily Sensations 15. Introspection 16. Belief and Thought Part 3: The Nature of Mind 17. Identification of the Mental with the Physical Bibliography Index