Financial Liberalization and Financial Crises in Turkey

The Turkish crises in the post-1990 period -1994,
2000, 2001- which have hitherto received
comparatively little international attention, are
ideal to show the peculiarities of each crisis and
individual country experiences and provide a
critical approach to the existing crisis literature.
The primary objective of this book is to
build on the valuable existing literature to
reassess the Turkish crises in the post-1990 period
with a different perspective and complements
previous studies by providing the missing links.
Going beyond the hitherto short-term focus, it
argues that their causes cannot simply be associated
with events just before their emergence; instead
they are the result of a cumulative process of
factors building up over many years. It offers a
more balanced treatment by taking into consideration
the domestic policy failures of a by and large
reactive state as well as the lax attitude of
international financial institutions.It analyzes the
reasons behind the lack of learning on the part of
both domestic and international decision makers. The
book argues that there were grave mistakes made in
the timing and sequencing of neoliberal reforms.

Autorentext

Aytül Ganioglu, Ph.D: Economics at Middle East Technical University, Turkey, MA: Economics at Boston Colloge. Economist at the Central Bank of Turkey, Ankara.

Klappentext

The Turkish crises in the post-1990 period -1994, 2000, 2001- which have hitherto received comparatively little international attention, are ideal to show the peculiarities of each crisis and individual country experiences and provide a critical approach to the existing crisis literature. The primary objective of this book is to build on the valuable existing literature to reassess the Turkish crises in the post-1990 period with a different perspective and complements previous studies by providing the missing links. Going beyond the hitherto short-term focus, it argues that their causes cannot simply be associated with events just before their emergence; instead they are the result of a cumulative process of factors building up over many years. It offers a more balanced treatment by taking into consideration the domestic policy failures of a by and large reactive state as well as the lax attitude of international financial institutions.It analyzes the reasons behind the "lack of learning" on the part of both domestic and international decision makers. The book argues that there were grave mistakes made in the timing and sequencing of neoliberal reforms.