If ratification does not affect compliance, why do countries bother?

The most interesting research questions of political
economy are on those subjects which somehow injure
our moral sensibilities, but where there is no clear
policy avenue through which to address them. This
book deals with just such a topic: while it is
uncontroversial to say that a world without child
labor would be better than one with, it is not clear
that legislation, either national or international,
will be successful in reducing it. This book presents
some evidence that fits nicely with intuitions about
child labor in the developing world. Regression
analysis of panel data covering 150 countries from
1970-2004 shows that macroeconomic conditions are
significant determinants of child labor, defined here
as the percent of children ages 10-14 who participate
in the workforce. The study shows that ratification
of the ILO's child labor convention does not
significantly predict lower levels of child labor,
leaving the second part of the book to answer the
question: If ratifying the child labor convention
does not affect compliance, why do countries bother?

Autorentext
Dawn Langan Teele is a graduate of Reed College in Portland, Oregon. She spent 2006-2007 studying development assistance in South and Southeast Asia as a Fellow with the Thomas J. Watson Foundation. She is currently a researcher at the Economic Growth Center at Yale University.

Klappentext
The most interesting research questions of political economy are on those subjects which somehow injure our moral sensibilities, but where there is no clear policy avenue through which to address them. This book deals with just such a topic: while it is uncontroversial to say that a world without child labor would be better than one with, it is not clear that legislation, either national or international, will be successful in reducing it. This book presents some evidence that fits nicely with intuitions about child labor in the developing world. Regression analysis of panel data covering 150 countries from 1970-2004 shows that macroeconomic conditions are significant determinants of child labor, defined here as the percent of children ages 10-14 who participate in the workforce. The study shows that ratification of the ILO's child labor convention does not significantly predict lower levels of child labor, leaving the second part of the book to answer the question: If ratifying the child labor convention does not affect compliance, why do countries bother?