In Defense of Intuitions

A reply to contemporary skepticism about intuitions and a priori knowledge, and a defense of neo-rationalism from a contemporary Kantian standpoint, focusing on the theory of rational intuitions and on solving the two core problems of justifying and explaining them.

Autorentext
Author Andrew Chapman: Andrew D. Chapman is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA. He also holds a master's degree from Northern Illinois University. Author Addison Ellis: Addison Ellis is a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA. He also holds a Master's degree from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Author Robert Hanna: Robert Hanna is a professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA, and the author or co-author of four books Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy [2001], Kant, Science, and Human Nature [2006], Rationality and Logic (2006), and Embodied Minds in Action (co-authored with M. Maiese, 2009). He has also held research or teaching positions at Cambridge University (UK), Monash University (AU), Yale University (USA), and York University (CA). Author Tyler Hildebrand: Tyler Hildebrand is an Acting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, Seattle, USA. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and his papers have appeared in Philosophical Studies and Philosophers' Imprint. Author Henry W. Pickford: Henry W. Pickford is Assistant Professor of German, and affiliated with Philosophy, at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA. He is the author of The Sense of Semblance: Philosophical Analyses of Holocaust Art and articles in journals including Modernism/Modernity, German Quarterly, MLN, Tolstoy Studies, and Architectural Theory Review, and is the editor and translator of Adorno's Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.

Inhalt
Introduction: The Old Rationalism and the New Rationalism PART I: RATIONALISM REDUX: RATIONAL INTUITIONS AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 1. The Self-Imposition of Authoritative Rational Intuition 2 Beyond Experimentalism 3. Rational Intuitions and Analytic Metaphysics 4. Towards a Defense of Rational Intuitions PART II: RATIONALISM REGAINED: THE BENACERRAF DILEMMAS AND RATIONAL INTUITIONS IN MATHEMATICS, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY 5. Introduction 6. Rationalism Lost: The Original Benacerraf Dilemma 7. The Benacerraf Dilemma Extended and Generalized 8. What is A Priori Knowledge? 9. What are Intuitions? 10. Rational Intuitions and the Irrelevance of Experimental Philosophy 11. Philosophical Intuitions, Scientific Naturalism, and The Mathematico-Centric Predicament 12. Kantian Structuralism 13. Kantian Intuitionism 14. Parsons, Kantian Structuralism, and Kantian Intuitionism 15. Why Logic Must Be Transcendental 16. Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index