Knowing Nature Without Mirrors

Objective truth has traditionally been conceived of
in terms of a thought s representation of or
correspondence with an immutable reality. Thomas
Kuhn s evolutionary picture of science based on
notions of incommensurable paradigms, different
worlds and revolutionary ruptures shatters the
traditional, representationalist view of scientific
development, but is often seen as impugning the very
notion of objectivity along with this positivistic
view of science. However, embracing Kuhn s
picture of science need not entail disclaiming
objectivity if one moves beyond the idea that
objectivity must be thought of in terms of
representations and fact-value dualisms. By thinking
with John Haugeland of objectivity as the idea that
everyone can be wrong about something and, thus, that
constituted objects can bring down theoretical
systems, the
tenable and textured notion of
antirepresentationalist objectivity implicit in
Kuhn's work begins to come into view. This notion of
objectivity allows us to go beyond the disposal of
objectivity that Richard Rorty finds necessary in
jettisoning the broken Cartesian representationalist
and dualistic epistemological tradition Rorty rightly
criticizes.

Autorentext

Joseph Bernardoni has a B.A. with Honors in Philosophy fromHaverford College in Pennsylvania and attended the University ofChicago Laboratory High School.

Klappentext

Objective truth has traditionally been conceived ofin terms of a thought's representation of orcorrespondence with an immutable reality. ThomasKuhn's evolutionary picture of science based onnotions of incommensurable paradigms, differentworlds and revolutionary ruptures shatters thetraditional, representationalist view of scientificdevelopment, but is often seen as impugning the verynotion of objectivity along with this positivisticview of science. However, embracing Kuhn'spicture of science need not entail disclaimingobjectivity if one moves beyond the idea thatobjectivity must be thought of in terms ofrepresentations and fact-value dualisms. By thinkingwith John Haugeland of objectivity as the idea thateveryone can be wrong about something and, thus, thatconstituted objects can bring down theoreticalsystems, thetenable and textured notion ofantirepresentationalist objectivity implicit inKuhn's work begins to come into view. This notion ofobjectivity allows us to go beyond the disposal ofobjectivity that Richard Rorty finds necessary injettisoning the broken Cartesian representationalistand dualistic epistemological tradition Rorty rightlycriticizes.