Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

This paper offers a coherent assessment of the stability created by nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Our examination posits the neorealist understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence in relation to alternative frameworks. To unfold the varying theoretical presuppositions upon which the concept of stability is based, three logically constructed analyses will be undertaken where the theories are explored in relation to empirical data. The Kargil Crisis in 1999 and the Twin Peak Crises did indeed reveal inconsistencies in the theory of nuclear deterrence, and the domestic situation in Pakistan has on several occasions threatened the nuclear stability between the countries. With this undertaking, a nuanced understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence will be offered.

Autorentext

Tina Søndergård Madsen is a bachelor student at Global Studies and Public Administration at Roskilde University(DK) Maia Juel Giorgio, Mark Westh and Jakob Wiegersma are bachelor students at Global Studies and International Development Studies at Roskilde University(DK) Maia is currently finishing her bachelor at Roma Tre University(IT)