On the Concept of Intentional Being

This thesis is an investigation of intentional being in a realist phenomenological context, its history and its characteristics. Intentional being is a type of being existing in nature that can be ascribed to immaterial entities that come into being and pass away. Beginning with Aristotle, notions of a second type of incorporeal being (besides the ideal) are traced as made evident in the works of ancient commentators through to the modern concept given by realist phenomenology. Major figures examined include Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry, Boethius, Brentano, Husserl and Ingarden. A habit is taken as an example of something exhibiting intentional being, and it is used to demonstrate intentional being s dependence on material being--specifically, a habit s dependence on the material nature of a subject and on the material world.

Autorentext

Charlene Elsby received her M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Guelph in 2009. She is currently working towards her Ph.D. at McMaster University.