Social Choice Theory

This introductory textbook on social choice theory makes the social choice theoretic framework and its main results, that have a direct bearing on the discourses on electoral rules and policy evaluation, accessible to a larger audience. The text is essentially self-contained. No previous knowledge of mathematical logic or relational algebra is assumed. Whatever technical prerequisites are needed, are developed in the text itself. Although the text is at an introductory level, there has been no compromise on rigor. Unlike most introductory books, the relevant proofs are not omitted; rather, they have been explained in detail. The text has a large number of examples so that the concepts and results become clear to the reader. There is a large number of exercises with full solutions provided at the end of the text, so that the reader can check her/his understanding of the material.

Self-contained with required prerequisites developed in the text itself and can be learnt without an instructor Contains numerous exercises with solutions, and examples to make concepts and results clear Provides high level of rigor notwithstanding the fact that the textbook is at an introductory level

Autorentext

Satish K. Jain is an economist. He was on the faculty of the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning of Jawaharlal Nehru University from 1978 to 2016; and was Reserve Bank of India Chair Professor at the time of superannuation in 2013. He was Indian Council of Social Science Research National Fellow during 2016-18. He has authored Economic Analysis of Liability Rules (Springer, 2015) and Domain Conditions and Social Rationality (Springer 2019); has edited Law and Economics (Oxford University Press, 2010), and co-edited Economic Growth, Efficiency, and Inequality (with Anjan Mukherji, Routledge, 2015.). His teaching and research interests include social choice theory, and law and economics.

Inhalt
Introduction.- Elementary Logic.- Sets, Relations, Functions.- Binary Relations.- Social Choice Theoretic Framework and Arrow Impossibility Theorem.- Some Important Value-Judgments, Rules and Theorems.- Implications of Weakening of Some of Arrow Conditions.- The Method of Majority Decision: Conditions for Transitivity and Quasi-Transitivity.- Strategic Aspects.- Summary and Concluding Remarks.