The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology.

Autorentext

Hamid Vahid is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Iran. He is the author of Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge (2005) and The Epistemology of Belief (2009).

Inhalt

Introduction

Part I: Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

1. Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework

2. A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification

3. Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation

Part II: Perceptual Reasons

4. The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience

5. Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification

6. Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons

Part III: Consequences

7. Higher-order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat

8. The Nature of Inference

9. The Epistemic Value of Emotions

10. Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons

11. Self-knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure