Who's to Blame for Greece?

This expanded and enlarged third edition of Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos' popular Who's to Blame for Greece? covers almost a decade of Greece's economic crisis from 2009 to 2019, as well as recent developments in the first months of 2020. It provides an overview of recent developments in the Greek economy and outlines the most important obstacles to a return to robust and sustainable growth rates. It considers the new optimism being developed in Greece after the crisis, but also the policy challenges facing Greece emanating from a deeply hurt economy in the aftermath of the crisis and the structural problems that persist.

The book covers the most recent issues that affect the Greek economy including, the migration crisis at the borders with Turkey as well as a faltering global economy hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. This book will appeal to researchers, practitioners and policy makers interested in the EU and the political economy of Greece andoffers valuable updates on the second edition.

Presents the latest, up to date, research on Greece's economy since Grexit Provides an overview of recent developments in the Greek economy and outlines the most important obstacles to a return to robust and sustainable growth rates. Covers the most recent issues that affect the Greek economy including, the migration crisis at the borders with Turkey as well as a faltering global economy hit by the Covid-19 pandemic Addresses debt and debt release from multi-disciplinary, analytical perspectives

Autorentext
Theodore Pelagidis is the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece (since September 2020) and Professor of Economics at the University of Piraeus, Department of Shipping, Greece. He has been a NR senior fellow at the Brookings Institution during 2012-2020, a NATO scholar at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, USA (1995); an NBG fellow at the London School of Economics, UK (2010); and an Onassis scholar and Fulbright fellow at Columbia University, USA (2008). He has also served as an expert to the IMF in the Internal Evaluation Office (2015) and to EC (Horizon, 2018). Michael Mitsopoulos is Director in Business Environment and Regulatory Affairs at the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, Greece. He holds a PhD in Economics from Boston University and has taught at the University of Piraeus and the Economic University of Athens. He has published extensively in academic journals and is the co-author with Pelagidis of Understanding the Crisisin Greece: From Boom to Bust (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 & 2012 2nd ed.) and of Greece. From Exit to Recovery? (Brookings, 2014).

Klappentext

1. Introduction.- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis.- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate.- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics.- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece.- Part II Greece's Free Fall 2010-2013.- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered.- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.- Part III. Looking Ahead.- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth?.- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change.- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into theAbove. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece.- Part IV. How Populism (2015-2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential.- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy.- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments.- 12. Conclusions.- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth.- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece.- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy.- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing.- 16. Greece's Comparative Advantage as China's Backdoor to Europe.- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece's Tax Regulations.- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families.- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth.- 20. Final Remarks.

   Inhalt

   1. Introduction.- Part I. The Party Period Before the Crisis.- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate.- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics.- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece.- Part II Greece's Free Fall 20102013.- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered.- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.- Part III. Looking Ahead.- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth?.- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change.- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into theAbove. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece.- Part IV. How Populism (20152017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential.- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy.- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments.- 12. Conclusions.- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth.- 13. How More Europe Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece.- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy.- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing.- 16. Greece's Comparative Advantage as China's Backdoor to Europe.- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece's Tax Regulations.- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families.- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth.- 20. Final Remarks.
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