Aiming at Truth

This book argues that it is not obvious what we means by saying our beliefs and assertions are 'truth-directed'. Do we weaken our notion of a belief if we deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism? This book defends a radically new 'ecological' model of knowledge, examining what might happen if we abandoned genuine belief.

'Aiming at Truth is high class philosophy. Nicholas Unwin argues for an iconoclastic position with clarity, elegance and wit. It is refreshing to read a book that grapples with the challenges presented by relativism and scepticism with such seriousness and depth.' - Julian Dodd, Department of Philosophy, University of Manchester, UK

'Nicholas Unwin's Aiming at Truth is an ambitious and wide-ranging book.' - Stephen R. Grimm, Mind

Autorentext
NICHOLAS UNWIN studied at the University of Oxford. He has taught at the Universities of Oxford and Essex, and is now Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bolton.

Inhalt
Introduction Truth and the Norms of Assertion Scepticism - And How Not to Avoid it Cognitive Contingency Belief and Acceptance Belief and Knowledge Pragmatism and the Value of Truth Relativism and the Limits of Conversability Mind, World and Realism Bibliography Index