An Identity Theory of Truth

Dodd explains that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation between true thought and fact is identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. The resulting modest identity theory allows for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.

Autorentext
JULIAN DODD lectures in philosophy at the University of Manchester, UK. His previous publications include Musical Works: An Essay in Ontology (OUP, 2007) and, with Helen Beebee, Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (OUP, 2005).

Inhalt
Preface Truthmakers, Facts and States of Affairs: A Critique of Correspondence Propositions, Indirect Speech and Truthbearers The Nature of Propositions: Thoughts versus States of Affairs Facts are True Thoughts From Correspondence to Identity A Variety of Deflationism Defended Aberrations of Rival Identity Theories Bibliography Index