Applying Game Theory to Water Conflicts in International River Basins

Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it is
also rare that water conflicts in
an international river basin are resolved through
cooperation among the riparian countries
that use the shared resources. One interpretation for
the lack of success is that the magnitude of
potential gains from cooperation is largely unknown
for most international rivers, and riparian countries
may have an incomplete or even inaccurate
knowledge of cooperative opportunities. In addition,
gains from cooperation will mean little to individual
riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors
are incentive compatible.

Game theory offers useful insights for assessing
cooperative solutions for water conflicts in
international river basins. Applying cooperative game
theory concepts such as core, nucleolus, and Shapley
value to Nile water conflicts, we examine the
incentive structure of both cooperative and
noncooperative strategies for different riparian
countries and establish some baseline conditions for
incentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin.

Autorentext

Dr. Xun Wu teaches in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy atthe National University of Singapore. He specializes in theanalysis and evaluation of policy reforms in developingcountries, with emphasis on social and environmental sectors. Hereceived his PhD in Public Policy Analysis from the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Klappentext

Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it isalso rare that water conflicts inan international river basin are resolved throughcooperation among the riparian countriesthat use the shared resources. One interpretation forthe lack of success is that the magnitude ofpotential gains from cooperation is largely unknownfor most international rivers, and riparian countriesmay have an incomplete or even inaccurateknowledge of cooperative opportunities. In addition,gains from cooperation will mean little to individualriparians unless the required cooperative behaviorsare incentive compatible. Game theory offers useful insights for assessingcooperative solutions for water conflicts ininternational river basins. Applying cooperative gametheory concepts such as core, nucleolus, and Shapleyvalue to Nile water conflicts, we examine theincentive structure of both cooperative andnoncooperative strategies for different ripariancountries and establish some baseline conditions forincentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin.