Argentina and Brazil's Politics of Taxation:

This book addresses the causes of tax policy changes,its direction and magnitude, in a comparative way bystudying three dimensions: centralization,progressivity, and level in Argentina and Brazilduring the 1980s and 1990s. I present a contingentapplication of veto players theory to explain changesin taxation. It gives importance to strategic actors'interactions and their institutional realities. I putforth the necessity of a reduction of effective vetoplayers for change to take place within a realm ofmultiple veto players. I argue that due to areduction of veto players during the late 1980s inboth cases, change took place in Argentina andBrazil, but to different extent and nature. Thereason for their divergences is the different natureof the respective veto players' reductions and theprevailing interests after these temporaryreductions. The result of the analysis is thatArgentina and Brazil decreased the progressivecapacity of their taxation, but Argentina decreasedit more than Brazil. I close this book with anempirical and theoretical puzzle regardingArgentina's lower taxation level than Brazil.

Autorentext

Hiram has a Ph.D. and an M.A. in political science from The Ohio State University and a B.S. in chemical engineering from the University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez. His research interests are: state capacity issues as affected by the construction of race (and intersection); Latin American politics; Puerto Rican Issues; and (Post)-Colonial Realities.