Bank Governance Structures and Risk Taking

The author analyses the composition of supervisory boards and its members' financial expertise, its influence on a banks' risk and performance profile, and its contribution to bank stability. Then he focuses on the effect of ownership concentration on credit risk and the role of debtholders as a stakeholder group within an international context.

The book sheds light on two closely related and highly relevant governance themes: the composition of supervisory boards and financial expertise as well as ownership structure. The author focuses on the financial expertise of supervisory boards and its impact on performance and risk. He analyses how supervisory boards are composed and how much financial expertise their members have, assesses the impact of financial expertise on a banks' risk-return profiles and investigates if financial expertise in internal bank governance contributes to more stability and less risk taking in banking. Finally, he examines the effects of the ownership structure on credit risk. He finds that banks with a more concentrated ownership structure tend to behave riskier, which is indicated by larger CDS spreads.

Autorentext

Dennis Froneberg studied Business Administration with a focus on corporate finance and risk management at the University of Mannheim. He works as a manager at a global insurance company in Frankfurt.

Inhalt
Contents: The Manifest Financial Expertise of Supervisory Board Members of German Regional Banks Impact of Supervisory Board Members' Professional Background on Regional Banks' Risk-Taking Bank Governance Structures, Financial Expertise of Supervisory Board Members, Overconfidence, and Bank Risk Taking CDS and Bank Ownership Structures: Does the credit Side Show Who Advocates More Risk?