Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition

After fascism's defeat in 1945 Britain did not co-operate with Franco's Spanish opponents to end his dictatorship. This study demonstrates how divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor but argues that Britain's strategic and commercial interests in Spain also acted as a disincentive. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened Iberian stability in 1947 did the British government turn to the Spanish opposition. With the advent of the Cold War, however, the opposition became irrelevant to British needs and Franco's survival was guaranteed.

Autorentext

DAVID DUNTHORN is Visiting Lecturer for Modern European History at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He graduated from Cambridge University in 1964 with an Honours Degree in Modern and Medieval languages. Having gained a Post-Graduate Certificate of Education he then taught French, Spanish and German in secondary schools in England and abroad for almost thirty years. He is co-editor (with Dr Christian Leitz) of Spain in an International Context, 1936-1959, and has had an article based on his doctoral research published in European History Quarterly.

Zusammenfassung

'The virtues of Dunthorn's study are many and incontestible...may well be the last word that needs to be said on Great Britain's role...' - American Historical Review

'An impressive study of the problems of attempting to pursue an ethical foreign policy. [Dunthorn] shows clearly the fundamental clash between Britain's long-term strategic geopolitical interests and the elimination of all aspects of international facism.' - David J. Dunthorn, Times LIterary Supplement

Inhalt
Acknowledgements Introduction Spanish Opposition before 1945 Britain and the Spanish Opposition until 1944 1945: Adjusting to Peace 1946: International Confrontation 1947: British Intervention 1948-1950: The Frustration of the Anti-Franco Impulse Conclusion List of Sources Consulted Index