Clientelism in the Legislative Branch

The defense of democracy as a value to be safeguarded in Parliament requires the institutionalization of mechanisms both for the choice of representatives and for the control of their behavior in the exercise of their mandates, tending to produce in them an action dedicated to achieving collective goods. To do so, it must evaluate incentives and risks based on a context in which the legacy of historical and cultural experience and the effectiveness of the present formal institutions coexist, mutually influencing each other. The case analyzed in this book shows not only the search by parliamentarians for ways to enhance the use of their clientelistic mandates in favor of their electoral success, but also the insufficiency of any isolated institutional change for a substantial change in the behavior of agents inserted in a given trajectory.

Autorentext

The author is graduated in Law, Master in Public Administration from the School of Government of FJP, and has a doctorate in Public Law from PUC-MG, and in Sociology from the University of Coimbra. He is a lawyer, consultant for ALEMG, and coordinator of post-graduate courses at the Escola do Legislativo. He was judge at TRE-MG and Professor at PUC-MG and UNIBH.