Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources

This book is the result of more than a decade's preoccupation with the issue of compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries, first as an interpreter in the Norwegian Coast Guard, then as a graduate student at the University of Troms0, and finally, as a PhD student at the University of Oslo and a research fellow at the FridtjofNansen Institute (FNI). Many of those who deserve a "thank you" in this preface have already been properly thanked on other occasions, among them my previous colleagues and superiors in the Norwegian Coast Guard. On the present occasion, I would particularly like to extend my thanks to the FNI leadership during my time here for giving me the trust and freedom to pursue my enthusiasm. Many other colleagues at the institute, from both the research and the administrative staff, have contributed to the present work. For fear of forgetting someone, I prefer not to mention names. There have to be a few exceptions though: From the administration, I would particularly like to thank Kari Lorentzen for her professional help in the library, and Ann Skarstad and Anne-Christine Thestrup for language assistance. Thanks to Claes Lykke Ragner for producing the map on page 7, and to Ivar M. Liseter for help in the preparation of camera-ready copy. Among the research staff, I would mention my long-standing fellow student and colleague both in the Coast Guard and at the FNI, Anne-Kristin J0rgensen.

Klappentext

The debate in the social sciences on the management of common resources crosses interdisciplinary boundaries. Regulation brings little gain if the established rules are not complied with by the users of the resource. The book discusses how public authorities can influence the users' decision making in this regard, using a variety of coercive and discursive measures. It thus addresses a topic that has suffered from neglect in both the theoretical and practical debate on natural resource management. br/ The Barents Sea fisheries are used as a case study in the book. The Norwegian Coastguard have produced violation statistics and these are used to investigate the level of compliance in these fisheries. Furthermore, a group of Norwegian and Russian fishermen have been consulted, together with representatives of Norwegian fishermen's associations, by means of personal, in-depth interviews aimed at revealing their attitudes to the regulation, management and enforcement systems.

Inhalt
1 Introduction.- Theoretical context the debate to be addressed.- Empirical background the Barents Sea and its fishermen.- Empirical context the issues to be raised.- Methodology.- the structure of the book.- 2 The Interaction of Research Programmes in Social Science Studies of the Commons.- Lakatos and scientific research programmes.- two traditions in the study of common-pool resources.- A Growing Literature on the Commons?.- Conclusion: scientific growth as interaction between theoretical traditions.- 3 A Model of Compliance in Fisheries Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application.- Background: the study of compliance.- Sources of compliance.- first-order and management-induced compliance.- two compliance mechanisms: coercive and discursive measures.- Management levels and subsystems of compliance.- an agenda for research.- 4 The Barents sea Fisheries Resources, Jurisdiction and Management.- The Barents Sea fish resources.- The fishing industries of Northern Norway and Northwestern Russia.- the legal setting.- Norway's fishery relations with other states.- The Russian-Norwegian fishery management regime.- Norwegian fisheries management.- Russian fisheries management.- 5 Compliance in the Barents Sea a Preliminary Discussion.- Fishing activity in the Barents Sea.- Violation rates in the Barents Sea fisheries.- Do violation rates reflect actual compliance?.- First-order compliance.- Compliance as a result of coercive measures.- Indirect coercion in the Svalbard Zone.- Legitimacy and discursive measures.- An observer's account of co-operative action in the Svalbard Zone.- Conclusion.- 6 How Fishermen Account for Compliance.- The interview setting.- A positive attitude towards the coast guard.- Legitimate regulations andprocedures.- Partly illegitimate research results.- Strict enforcement.- Self-induced compliance.- Conclusion.- 7 Co-Management and Communities in the Barents sea Fisheries.- Theoretical revisit: co-management and communities.- Co-management in Northwest Russian fisheries.- Co-management in Norwegian fisheries.- The Barents Sea fishing communities.- Co-management and compliance.- Conclusion.- 8 Investigation Revisited.- Methodology revisited: the stories fishermen tell.- Hypotheses revisited: discourse or guns?.- Epistemological Context Revisited: Contributions to the Scientific Debate.- 9 Concluding Remarks.- Co-management beyond user-group participation.- Co-management a system-centric perspective?.- Implications of the methodological and epistemological choices Made.- References.