Consciousness

This book introduces the "hard problem of phenomenal consciousness. Basically, this work deals with the questions such as how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious experience , how the physical systems or the physical brain processes give rise to conscious experience , what is the relation between the physical, the psychological and the phenomenal and finally what is the phenomenal experience or phenomenal feel . There are two main streams trying to find a solution to (or dissolve) these kinds of questions: the reductive and the nonreductive doctrines. By referring to Chalmers' nonreductive theory of consciousness, I will indicate his main objection to materialist theories by pointing out what he thinks is missing in them. This issue will be followed by arguing that what makes Chalmers' arguments against materialists views actually applies to his own theory of consciousness as well. This missing factor is a "first person point of view and an "ability to have a first person point of view , that is, an ability for a being to have a first person access to the results of his own physical cognitive information processing system.

Autorentext

Mastoureh Sadeghnia is a PhD candidate in philosophy of mind at Queen's University. Her main philosophical interests lie in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In particular her research focuses on the problems of consciousness. Recently she is developing interests in issues such as Neurophilosophical approach to consciousness.

Klappentext

This book introduces the "hard problem of phenomenal consciousness. Basically, this work deals with the questions such as"how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious experience", "how the physical systems or the physical brain processes give rise to conscious experience", "what is the relation between the physical, the psychological and the phenomenal" and finally "what is the phenomenal experience or phenomenal feel". There are two main streams trying to find a solution to (or dissolve) these kinds of questions: the reductive and the nonreductive doctrines. By referring to Chalmers' nonreductive theory of consciousness, I will indicate his main objection to materialist theories by pointing out what he thinks is missing in them. This issue will be followed by arguing that what makes Chalmers' arguments against materialists views actually applies to his own theory of consciousness as well. This missing factor is a "first person point of view and an "ability to have a first person point of view , that is, an ability for a being to have a first person access to the results of his own physical cognitive information processing system.