Consociational Federalism

This work focuses on constitutional amendments in divided societies. It analyzes and compares the ways in which constitutional amendment procedures are organized in states with significant linguistic, national or cultural cleavages. To explore this issue, we mobilize the theoretical framework of consociational federalism.

Autorentext

Dave Guénette is Assistant Professor at the Université de Sherbrooke's Faculty of Law. His work focuses on Canadian and comparative federalism, consociational democracy, and constitutional amendments in divided or multinational societies.

Inhalt

Acknowledgements - Foreword - Introduction - Consociational Federalism as a Lens for Studying Constitutional Amendments in Divided Societies - Constitutional Amendments by Divided Political Elites - Elite Cohesion: Centralized Constitutional Amendment Processes - 1. The Grand Political Coalition and its Consociational Influence - 2. The Federal Parliament, Qualified Majorities and the Gathering of Representative Elites - Elite Autonomy: Decentralized Constitutional Amendment Processes - 3. The Ratification of Constitutional Amendments by Member States and the Asymmetrical Options - 4. Constitutional Initiative and Subnational Constitutionalism by Member States - Constitutional Amendments by a Divided People - Consulting the People: When Citizens Vote on Constitutional Amendments - 5. Indirect Consultation of Citizens: Parliamentary Dissolution and Elections During Constitutional Amendments - 6. Direct Consultation of Citizens: the Political and Legal Consequences of Referendums - Defining the Terms of Referendums: Drafting and Adopting Amendments - 7. Initiating a Constitutional Referendum and Drafting its Content - 8. Qualified Majorities and Greater Popular Consensus on Amendments - Conclusion