Constitutional Polarization

In this book, Josep M. Colomer argues, against much conventional wisdom, that political polarization is embedded in the constitutional design.

Autorentext

Josep M. Colomer is a political scientist at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University in Washington, DC, and a life member of the American Political Science Association. He is the author or editor of two dozen books about comparative political institutions and governance, including the reference textbook The Science of Politics and the most recent monograph Democracy and Globalization. Personal website: www.josepcolomer.com

Inhalt

Introduction: It's the Institutions, stupid! Part 1: A Tamed Democracy 1. Democracy Was Only for Small Countries 2. From Empire to Federation 3. Montesquieu Did Not Speak English Part 2: An Elected King with the Name of President 4. The Archaic Presidential Election 5. Biased Filters and Checks 6. The Presidentialist Temptation Part 3: Two Parties with Narrow Agendas 7. The Framers Did Not Like Factions 8. The Unforeseen Emergence of Only Two Parties 9. Shifting Majorities and Accordion Agendas Part 4: Either Internal Anger or External Fear 10. Anarchy and Civil War 11. Cold-War Fear and Cooperation 12. The Ongoing Turmoil Epilogue: A Future in Hope Conclusion