Constitutive Emergence

The mind-body problem has two essential aspects the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. Dualism is able to address the latter but not the former aspect adequately. Reductive physicalism is able to address the former but not the latter aspect adequately. Non-reductive physicalism, which aims to address both aspects of the mind-body problem adequately, has established itself as the orthodox position. However, Jaegwon Kim asserts that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position in holding both the mutually incompatible non-reductivism thesis and physicalism thesis. This argument introduces a dilemma in non-reductive physicalism, which leads to its inevitable collapse into dualism, epiphenomenalism or reductive physicalism. To avoid this collapse, I propose a version of non-reductive physicalism based on the contentious notions of constitution and emergence. In my view, constitution is neither the identity of parts and wholes nor the co-location of two distinct objects. And emergence is neither a strong ontological thesis which affirms downward causation nor a weak epistemological thesis which denies relational properties.

Autorentext

This work, a copy of Wong's Masters thesis, argues for a non-reductive solution to the mind-body problem based on the concepts of constitution and emergence. Wong holds a PhD in Philosophy from the National University of Singapore.

Klappentext

The mind-body problem has two essential aspects - the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. Dualism is able to address the latter but not the former aspect adequately. Reductive physicalism is able to address the former but not the latter aspect adequately. Non-reductive physicalism, which aims to address both aspects of the mind-body problem adequately, has established itself as the orthodox position. However, Jaegwon Kim asserts that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position in holding both the mutually incompatible non-reductivism thesis and physicalism thesis. This argument introduces a dilemma in non-reductive physicalism, which leads to its inevitable collapse into dualism, epiphenomenalism or reductive physicalism. To avoid this collapse, I propose a version of non-reductive physicalism based on the contentious notions of constitution and emergence. In my view, constitution is neither the identity of parts and wholes nor the co-location of two distinct objects. And emergence is neither a strong ontological thesis which affirms downward causation nor a weak epistemological thesis which denies relational properties.