Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

The perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition

In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today's most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts.

Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more.

• Presents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology
• Contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances
• Focuses on core areas of epistemology
• Uses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion

• All-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemology

  Part of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.

  Autorentext

  The Editors

  BLAKE ROEBER is Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and has published in Nous, PPR, Mind, and other leading journals.

  ERNEST SOSA is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of numerous papers and books on epistemology and is the editor of Nous, Philosophical Issues, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  MATTHIAS STEUP is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and numerous articles on epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty and the co-editor of A Companion to Epistemology.

  JOHN TURRI is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo, where he directs the Philosophical Science Lab. He has published research in many leading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science journals.

  Inhalt

  Notes on Contributors vii

  Preface to the Third Edition xiii

  Preface to the Second Edition xiv

  Preface to the First Edition xv

  Introduction xvii

  1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1

  Knowledge Comes First 1
  Mona Simion

  Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7
  Aidan McGlynn

  Knowledge Still Comes First 14
  Mona Simion

  Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16
  Aidan McGlynn

  2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23

  Is Justification Just in the Head? 23
  Clayton Littlejohn

  The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36
  Kurt L. Sylvan

  3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55

  Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55
  Matthew McGrath

  Suspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66
  Jane Friedman

  4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79

  There Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79
  Susanna Rinard

  There Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81
  Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen

  Reply to and Kelly and Cohen 93
  Susanna Rinard

  5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103

  Introductions and Stage-Setting 103
  Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci

  A Permissive Notion of Rationality 105
  Miriam Schoenfield

  We Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110
  Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci

  Is the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116
  Miriam Schoenfield

  A Final Plea for Impermissivism 121
  Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci

  Some Final Thoughts 123
  Miriam Schoenfield

  Permissivism and Metaepistemology 124
  Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield

  6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127

  Evidence Is Seemings 127
  Michael Huemer

  Evidence Is Not Seemings 134
  Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

  Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142
  Michael Huemer

  Preservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146
  Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

  7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151

  Knowing Can Include Luck 151
  Stephen Hetherington

  There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159
  Duncan Pritchard

  On Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169
  Stephen Hetherington

  Reply to Hetherington 171
  Duncan Pritchard

  8 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175

  Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175
  Timothy Williamson

  The Significance of A Priori Justification 183
  Paul Boghossian

  Response to Boghossian 191
  Timothy Williamson

  Reply to Williamson 194
  Paul Boghossian

  9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201

  How to Use Thought Experiments 201
  Elijah Chudnoff

  A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209
  Wesley Buckwalter

  How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218
  Elijah Chudnoff

  Thinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222
  Wesley Buckwalter

  10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229

  Credences Are Degrees of Belief 229
  Roger Clarke

  Is Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237
  Julia Staffel

  Two in the Model, One in the Head 247
  Roger Clarke

  11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253

  Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253
  Alex Worsnip

  Epistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263
  J. Adam Carter

  A Brief Reply to Carter 274
  Alex Worsnip

  12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279

  A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279
  Elizabeth Fricker

  Anti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290
  Sanford C. Goldberg

  Comments on Sanford Goldberg's "Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony" 300
  Elizabeth Fricker

  Comments on Elizabeth Fricker's "A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony" 301
  Sanford C. Goldberg

  13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305

  Skepticism Is Common Sense 305
  Allan Hazlett

  Skepticism Is Not Common Sense 311
  Krista Lawlor

  Reply to Lawlor 318
  Allan Hazlett

  Reply to Hazlett 323
  Krista Lawlor

  14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329

  Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329
  Matthew A. Benton

  Knowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339
  Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

  Index 355