Default Risk of Greek Government during the Crisis of 2010

The book analyses Greek fiscal crisis which was discovered by markets at the end of 2009. The book is divided into two parts. In the historically-analytical part we show the evolution of the Greek fiscal crisis from its foundations in 1970s until April 2011, when the work was finished. We try to find the true roots of the crisis and we also summarize its political evolution. In the theoretical part the evolution of the probability of default of Greek government is estimated using parsimonious method using government bond market data. A method using data from the market of credit default swaps is also summarized. The work tests several hypotheses. The book mainly shows that the crisis should not have been such a surprise and that markets were probably short sighted. We also show that European aid package introduced in the spring 2010 did not calm the markets. At the end of the book we show further possible research ideas.

Autorentext

Mgr. Old ich Veselý was born in Prague in the Czech Republic in 1986. He finished his studies of Masters Economics programme on the Charles University in Prague summa cum laude in 2011. He studied the probability of default of Greek government in his diploma thesis. He has been working as an algorithmic trader since 2011.

Klappentext

The book analyses Greek fiscal crisis which was discovered by markets at the end of 2009. The book is divided into two parts. In the historically-analytical part we show the evolution of the Greek fiscal crisis from its foundations in 1970s until April 2011, when the work was finished. We try to find the true roots of the crisis and we also summarize its political evolution. In the theoretical part the evolution of the probability of default of Greek government is estimated using parsimonious method using government bond market data. A method using data from the market of credit default swaps is also summarized. The work tests several hypotheses. The book mainly shows that the crisis should not have been such a surprise and that markets were probably short sighted. We also show that European aid package introduced in the spring 2010 did not calm the markets. At the end of the book we show further possible research ideas.