Designing Democracy

This book presents a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to improve the functioning of democracies. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. The second part presents new rules for decision-making, agendas and agenda settings which can transcend the limitations of prevailing democracies in achieving desirable outcomes.

Set of new - and as yet untried - proposals for changing the functioning of democracies for the better Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Inhalt
Incentive Contracts and Elections.- Overview.- Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies.- Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts.- Reelection Thresholds.- Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards.- Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics.- Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting.- Overiview.- Examples for Agenda Rules.- Flexible Majority Rules.- Democratic Mechanisms.- Fair Division.