Deterrence and Defence in a Post-Nuclear World

This book studies the obstacles to conventional deterrence, deterrence Soviet style, Soviet incentives for conventional deterrence and arms control.

Inhalt
Part 1 Obstacles to conventional deterrence: flexible response in Europe; convergence of flexible response and forward defence; the American efforts to structure flexible response; the requirements for conventional deterrence. Part 2 Deterrence Soviet style: offensive defence; Stalin's conventional defence - back to the future?; the legacy of Stalin; Khrushchev - strategic bluff or peripheral strategy? the Brezhnev period - the origins of flexible options; flexible response since Brezhnev; the shrinking Soviet nuclear umbrella - cover thyself; reasonable sufficiency - revolution or ruse? Part 3 Soviet incentives for conventional deterrence: strategic implications of the nationalities; implications for US strategy. Part 4 Arms control - can we make this trip with the Russians?: the charges of noncompliance; the evidence; the military significance of noncompliance issues. Part 5 A post-nuclear world - the unfinished agenda: arms control strategy and nuclear modernization - shaping deterrence stability; Soviet strategic modernization after START; shaping strategy and targeting policies for deterrence stability; strategic stability and conventional deterrence.