Environmental Regime Negotiations

The purpose of this book has been to test and refinethe effects of power-based and knowledge-basedvariables on negotiation processes, perceptions, andoutcomes in environmental regime negotiations withthe quantitative-statistical analysis. Power and knowledge variables were operationalized ina 2 x 2 experimental design to understand theinteraction and main effects of power (symmetry andasymmetry) and knowledge (knowledge and no-knowledge)conditions on negotiation indicators collectedthrough pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires.Tape-recorded simulation negotiations of the ozoneregime were content-analyzed as well as the real-lifeclimate change negotiations to constructcompetitive/cooperative and disagree/agree indicesfor a negotiation strategy/style analysis. The result indicated that knowledge is beneficialwhen the parties in simulation had equal power. It ispossible to argue that a power symmetric structuremanaged the complexity because equality is stable andsimple and that scientific/consensual knowledgereduced uncertainty. The analysis should beespecially useful to professionals in InternationalRelations and Environmental Science.

Autorentext

Mr.Sezai Ozcelik,Ph.D:Conflict Analysis and Resolution,George Mason University,Fairfax,VA,USA;M.A.:International Peace and Conflict Studies, American University,Washington D.C.,USA;B.A.:International Relations,Ankara University,Turkey;Currently,Assistant Prof.Dr.,Cankiri Karatekin University,International Relations Department,Cankiri,Turkey.