Epistemic Paternalism

Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.

"As social scientists learn how to shape our environments to make us better reasoners and happier citizens, issues of autonomy and paternalism (epistemic and otherwise) are bound to become more urgent and pressing. With this book, Ahlstrom-Vij has made a clear and compelling case for the permissibility of epistemically paternalistic practices. And despite my worries, I think it is a case that, with slight modifications, wins the day."

Michael A Bishop, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij makes the case that we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement, but must instead endorse a general policy of epistemic paternalism. Epistemic paternalism, he says, is the policy of interfering with an agent's inquiry, for the epistemic good of the agent, without need of the agent's consent. That's a bold thesis, and this is an engaging and rigorously argued book."

Robert B Talisse, New Books in Philosophy

Autorentext
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He specializes in social epistemology and epistemic normativity.

Inhalt
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended Bibliography Index