Essays in Procrastination, Commitment and Fairness

This book consists of behavioral and experimental
work on self-control problems, as well as effects of
reputation on fairness considerations. Chapter 1
presents a theoretical model of task performance
behavior where people have time-inconsistent
preferences. The main premise is that the likelihood
to procrastinate and to take measures to prevent
procrastination might change as individuals join
groups. We argue that group membership, due to its
payoff structures and social pressures, might be
conceived as a commitment device both for those who
are aware of their problem and for those who are
not. Chapter 2 is an experiment that tests a
question suggested in Chapter 1: Do people s
procrastination behavior change in groups? If people
rely on costly devices to counteract self-control
problems, do groups mitigate or exacerbate this
reliance? Why are commitment devices underutilized?
The third chapter takes on another behavioral topic
and shows that past behavior might affect people s
fairness judgments. Including information of past
play, we analyze rejection rates in ultimatum games
and we observe that reputation matters.

Autorentext

Gizem Saka, PhD, studied Behavioral Economics at Cornell University. She taught at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University and at the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University. She is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at Middlebury College, Vermont.

Klappentext

This book consists of behavioral and experimental work on self-control problems, as well as effects of reputation on fairness considerations. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical model of task performance behavior where people have time-inconsistent preferences. The main premise is that the likelihood to procrastinate and to take measures to prevent procrastination might change as individuals join groups. We argue that group membership, due to its payoff structures and social pressures, might be conceived as a commitment device both for those who are aware of their problem and for those who are not. Chapter 2 is an experiment that tests a question suggested in Chapter 1: Do people's procrastination behavior change in groups? If people rely on costly devices to counteract self-control problems, do groups mitigate or exacerbate this reliance? Why are commitment devices underutilized? The third chapter takes on another behavioral topic and shows that past behavior might affect people's fairness judgments. Including information of past play, we analyze rejection rates in ultimatum games and we observe that reputation matters.