Hedge Fund Regulation by Banking Supervision

Hedge Fund regulation is a paradox. If regulators do not regulate Hedge Funds, markets may be at risk and investors could be insufficiently protected. On the other hand, if Hedge Funds are over-regulated jurisdictional arbitrage with all its economic detriments may occur. One way to address this dichotomy is to set up specific rules requiring disclosure and registration. So far only the German legislator and the US SEC have decided to follow this path of regulation. The dissertation shows how these regulators and others have addressed the problem, underscoring the limited utility of such regulation. Using the analytical tool of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Incomplete Contract Theory, this book demonstrates that indirect regulation of Hedge Funds via Basle II addresses the problem of jurisdictional arbitrage, limited transparency, and high transaction costs, whilst ensuring secrecy and high net returns. Basle II also indirectly addresses systemic risk problems and Hedge Fund's level of leverage, as well as moral hazard problems by reforming lending practice and disclosure to Hedge Funds, thereby decreasing the capital leverage ration of Hedge Funds.

Autorentext

The Author: Wulf Alexander Kaal; 1994-2002 studies of Social Science, Economics and Law at Humboldt University Berlin and at the University of Liverpool (UK); 2002-2005 J.D. and LL.M. at the University of Illinois (USA); 2005 Dr. iur. at Humboldt University Berlin; since 2005 Associate with an American Law Firm in New York City.

Inhalt

Contents: Hedge Fund regulation in the US, UK, and Germany - A comparative institutional analysis - Indirect regulation of Hedge Funds via Basle II - Key problems: transaction costs, systemic risk, investor protection, moral hazard, jurisdictional arbitrage, transparency, leverage, retailization, hedge fund fraud, growth of hedge fund industry.