Hobbes on Legal Authority and Political Obligation

Hobbes on Legal Authority and Political Obligation develops a new interpretation of Hobbes's theory of political obligation. According to the account developed in the book, the directives issued by the sovereign as introducing authoritative requirements, so that subjects are morally obligated to obey them.

Autorentext
Luciano Venezia is Assistant Research Fellow at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council and Instructor at the National University of Quilmes, Argentina. He has a MA from the University of Arizona and a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires and the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris. He specializes in political and legal philosophy as well as the history of political thought.

Inhalt

Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1. The Project 1.2. Method 1.3. Strategy 1.4. Textual Evidence Chapter 2. Coercion, Rational Self-Interest, and Obligation 2.1. Conflict in the State of Nature 2.2. Anti-Social Passions and Sanctions for Non-Compliance 2.3. Legal Coercion, Private Good, and the Common Good 2.4. The End of the Story? 2.5. Lloyd's Account Chapter 3. The Authority of Law 3.1. The Concept of Authority 3.2. Even For the Rationally and Morally Perfect 3.3. The Command Theory of Law 3.4. Arbitration 3.5. Beliefs or Actions? Chapter 4. Political Obligation 4.1. Egoism 4.2. Moral Reasons in Hobbes? 4.3. The Theory of Political Obligation 4.4. The Mutual Containment Thesis 4.5. The Rationale for Political Disobedience Chapter 5. Contractarianism 5.1. Hobbes' Account: An Interpretation 5.2. What Difference does the Sovereign Make? 5.3. Contractual Obligation: Prudential or Deontological? 5.4. Obligation and Reason Chapter 6. The Hobbesian Analysis of Contracts under Coercion: A Critique 6.1. Hobbes on Voluntariness, Coercion, and Obligation 6.2. Coercion, Rationality and Voluntariness 6.3. Rationality without Voluntariness 6.4. Conclusion Final Remarks Bibliography