Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics

As champions of deontology and consequentialism respectively, Kant and Sidgwick disagree on many important issues. However, close examination reveals a surprising amount of consensus on various topics including moral psychology, moral epistemology, and moral theology.

Immanuel Kant and Henry Sidgwick are towering figures in the history of moral philosophy. Kant's views on ethics continue to be discussed and studied in detail not only in philosophy, but also theology, political science, and legal theory. Meanwhile, Sidgwick is emerging as the philosopher within the utilitarian tradition who merits the same meticulous treatment that Kant receives. As champions of deontology and consequentialism respectively, Kant and Sidgwick disagree on many important issues. However, close examination reveals a surprising amount of consensus on various topics including moral psychology, moral epistemology, and moral theology.

This book presents points of agreement and disagreement in the writings of these two giants of philosophical ethics. The chapters will stimulate discussions among moral theorists and historians of philosophy by applying cutting-edge scholarship on each philosopher to shed light on some of the more perplexing arguments and views of the other, and by uncovering and examining points of agreement between Sidgwick and Kant as possible grounds for greater convergence in contemporary moral philosophy. This is the first full-length volume to investigate Sidgwick and Kant side by side. It will be of major interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy and its history.

Autorentext

Tyler Paytas is ***a Research Fellow in the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at Australian Catholic University. His articles have appeared in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Kantian Review, Phronesis and Utilitas. He is the co-author (with Nicholas Baima) of Plato's Pragmatism: Rethinking the Relationship between Ethics and Epistemology* (Routledge, forthcoming).

Tim Henning is Professor and Chair of Practical Philosophy and History of Philosophy at the Universität Stuttgart. His articles have appeared in Ethics, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, and The Philosophical Review. He is the author of From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse.

Inhalt

Introduction

Tyler Paytas and Tim Henning

Part I. From Theory to Practice

1. Practical Ethics in Sidgwick and Kant

Anthony Skelton

2. Self-Defeating Moral Theories and Kant's Doctrine of Right

Tim Henning

Part II. Moral Knowledge and Motivation

3. Sidgwick and Kant on Practical Knowledge and Rational Action

Carla Bagnoli

4. Sidgwick's Kantian Account of Moral Motivation

David Phillips

Part III. Intuitionism and Disagreement

5. On Seeing What is Right: Sidgwick, Kant, and Philosophical Intuitionism

Roger Crisp

6. Peerless: Sidgwick, Kant, and Peer Disagreement

Robert Shaver

Part IV. Freedom of Will

7. Freedom and Happiness: Sidgwick's Critique of Kant

Paul Guyer

8. Kant and Sidgwick on Freedom of Will, Morality, and Responsibility

Mariko Nakano-Okuno

Part V. Ultimate Ends

9. Aristotelian Eudaimonism and the Dualism of Practical Reason

Sukaina Hirji

10. Beneficent Governor of the Cosmos: Kant and Sidgwick on the Moral

Necessity of God

Tyler Paytas