Knowledge's Value

Is knowledge better than true belief? Socratesthought so. If he was right, and it is better to knowthan to believe, then how is that the case? Knowledgeis generally considered to be some sort of justifiedtrue belief; so, is it justification that makesknowledge somehow better? These questions motivatethis book (specifically whether justification canpossibly account for a value unique to knowledge).The book begins by presenting the justificatorylandscape-in particular, the features of and divisionbetween externalist justification and internalistjustification. The first major challenge, theSwamping Problem, appears to fatally woundexternalism while only damaging internalism. However,it becomes apparent that internalism qua internalismcannot exclusively account for knowledge's value.Throughout the book, externalism's importance toepistemology becomes apparent. This invites areconsideration of the value of externalism, and thebook concludes that knowledge's value can besubstantiated by an appeal to externalistjustification. This analysis can engage those new toepistemology and interest those looking into its future.

Autorentext

Shannon Balderson studied philosophy and mathematics at UNSW in Sydney, Australia. She received her BSc/BA(Hons) in 2005 and her MA in 2007. She currently teaches.

Klappentext
Is knowledge better than true belief? Socrates thought so. If he was right, and it is better to know than to believe, then how is that the case? Knowledge is generally considered to be some sort of justified true belief; so, is it justification that makes knowledge somehow better? These questions motivate this book (specifically whether justification can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge). The book begins by presenting the justificatory landscape-in particular, the features of and division between externalist justification and internalist justification. The first major challenge, the Swamping Problem, appears to fatally wound externalism while only damaging internalism. However, it becomes apparent that internalism qua internalism cannot exclusively account for knowledge's value. Throughout the book, externalism's importance to epistemology becomes apparent. This invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism, and the book concludes that knowledge's value can be substantiated by an appeal to externalist justification. This analysis can engage those new to epistemology and interest those looking into its future.