Kripke on Necessity

It is generally conceded that Saul Kripke'sgroundbreaking monograph Naming and Necessity (1980)has rearranged the landscape ofcontemporary philosophy. In his book, Kripke setsforth an intriguing line of thought which involves anumber of original theses within analytic philosophyand issues into a comprehensive theory ofmetaphysical essentialism. The present studyundertakes a thorough investigation of Naming andNecessity, aiming to attain a perspicuous expositionof the Kripkean programme, to clarify the keynotions, and to argue that the realist theory ofmetaphysical essentialism cannot be retained. Theinquiry is thematically concerned with the epistemicand the ontological levels of modality, advancingthereby certain novel ideas regarding the analysisof modal statements which avoid the inconsistenciesof realist essentialism and suggest a non-realistreading of Kripkean modality. This book claims theconsideration not only of advanced philosophystudents and specialists in the field but also ofcognitive and social scientists interested in thephilosophy of essentialism and modal epistemology.

Autorentext

PhD in theoretical philosophy, 2005, Lund University, Sweden. Independent researcher in the philosophy of mind; professional practitioner in applied philosophy; currently writing a book on the philosophy of thinking with special focus on Wittgenstein, Kripke, Zen, and Abhidhamma.

Klappentext
It is generally conceded that Saul Kripke's groundbreaking monograph Naming and Necessity (1980) has rearranged the landscape of contemporary philosophy. In his book, Kripke sets forth an intriguing line of thought which involves a number of original theses within analytic philosophy and issues into a comprehensive theory of metaphysical essentialism. The present study undertakes a thorough investigation of Naming and Necessity, aiming to attain a perspicuous exposition of the Kripkean programme, to clarify the key notions, and to argue that the realist theory of metaphysical essentialism cannot be retained. The inquiry is thematically concerned with the epistemic and the ontological levels of modality, advancing thereby certain novel ideas regarding the analysis of modal statements which avoid the inconsistencies of realist essentialism and suggest a non-realist reading of Kripkean modality. This book claims the consideration not only of advanced philosophy students and specialists in the field but also of cognitive and social scientists interested in the philosophy of essentialism and modal epistemology.