Legal Certainty and Central Bank Autonomy in Latin American Emerging Markets

This book provides a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of six Latin American central banks to determine whether there is legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy. Based on this, it ascertains whether the way in which legal institutions are designed specifically those that rule the autonomy of the central bank provides reasons to believe that central banks can keep inflation at bay even if governments face fiscal problems or pursue contradictory objectives. The analysis covers three key areas: a constitutional analysis, a detailed study of the central bank statutes and a study of a number of underexplored threats to central bank autonomy. After defining and identifying different types of legal certainty and linking them to the credibility of government promises, the author goes on to examine the grounds that the law provides for confidence that central banks operate independently of political influence. The secondpart of the book focuses on a granular analysis of the legal design of the central banks' objectives and autonomy. Lastly, the third part features two case studies that represent little-known and unusual institutional threats to legal certainty relating to central bank autonomy, such as the interventions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in the autonomy of the Colombian central bank, and the interventions of the Argentinean executive and legislative branches in the autonomy of Argentina's central bank through stabilization plans introduced via emergency laws and decrees.In sum, the book suggests that there are serious doubts about the ability of Latin American central banks to maintain price stability over time. Although central banks were granted a degree of autonomy, authorities in Latin American countries are able to affect central bank decisions. Most importantly, a lack of clarity, inconsistencies, or generous exceptions in the law provide ways for authorities to influence central banks even without bending or disregarding the rules.

Presents the argument that legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy is important to allow central banks to operate independently of political influence Provides a granular comparative analysis of six legal frameworks regarding central bank autonomy in Latin America from the perspective of legal certainty Analyzes the credibility of state commitments from a legal point of view, focusing on the role that legal rules play in the credibility of central bank commitments Includes a chapter on the legal analysis of court interventions in central bank autonomy in Colombia

Autorentext

Dr. Andrea Lucia Tapia-Hoffmann is an Ecuadorian-German attorney. Andrea holds a law degree from the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE) in Quito, Ecuador and a doctoral degree from the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in Germany. She has broad international experience after working for several years in Ecuador and the United States. Since 2017 Andrea has worked as an in-house lawyer and data protection specialist in Germany. Her research interests are in economic law, comparative law, human rights, and privacy law.

Inhalt

1 Introduction.- 2 Legal Certainty.- 3 Legal Certainty and Legal Commitment Mechanisms.- 4 Central Bank Objectives and Autonomy.- 5 Central Bank Statutes and Autonomy.- The Constitutional Court of Colombia versus Central Bank Autonomy.- 7 Economic Emergency and Central Bank Autonomy in Argentina.- 8 Towards Monetary Stability in Latin America.