Limits of Economic and Social Knowledge

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The book aims to show that the deterministic vision embodied in conventional economic modelling is neither consistent with nor supported by the state of the art in mathematics, logic, and physical science. DeCanio recognizes that economic agents are intrinsically free and somewhat unpredictable, which is essential for economic and social theory.

Autorentext
Stephen J. DeCanio is Professor of Economics, Emeritus (University of California, Santa Barbara, USA). From 1986 to 1987 he served as a senior staff economist at the President's Council of Economic Advisers. He participated in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. He has been a recipient of the Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought, as well as a 'Best of the Best' Stratospheric Ozone Protection Award from the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Inhalt

  1. Introduction and Overview 2. Consequences of computational limits 3. Simulating Simple Societies 4. Economics and Natural Science 5. Economics, Behaviorism, and Utilitarianism 6. A Case Study and Cautionary Tale: Climate Policy 7. Politics and Governance 8. The Gift of Freedom

Weitere Informationen

  • Allgemeine Informationen
    • GTIN 09781349475919
    • Lesemotiv Verstehen
    • Genre Economics
    • Auflage 1st ed. 2014
    • Sprache Englisch
    • Anzahl Seiten 250
    • Herausgeber Springer Palgrave Macmillan
    • Größe H216mm x B140mm
    • Jahr 2014
    • EAN 9781349475919
    • Format Kartonierter Einband
    • ISBN 978-1-349-47591-9
    • Veröffentlichung 01.01.2014
    • Titel Limits of Economic and Social Knowledge
    • Autor S. DeCanio
    • Gewicht 341g

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