Mechanisms and Models

Drawing on the work of William Bechtel and Ronald
Giere, the book
outlines an interpretive framework for the study of
the sciences
based on mechanisms and models rather than laws. The
first part
looks at the history of mathematics and mechanistic
explanation,
which developed hand in hand in the 17th century and
provided
support for the idea that scientific knowledge is
epitomized by laws
of nature. The second part develops a framework for
mechanistic
explanation that is not based primarily on laws. The
third part
presents a model-based account of scientific
explanation and a
naturalized account of reasoning and judgment, in
which scientists
are seen as constructing models that are similar to
various aspects
of the real world rather than discovering universal
generalizations,
or laws of nature, the truth of which can be
warranted by the
employment of universal principles of rationality
that can be
justified a priori; and the use of models to
represent the world can
only be understood within the context of scientific
practice, in which
interests and purposes, as well as empirical
observations, play a role
in determining what models are proposed,

Autorentext

Donald Dryden received his Ph.D. in philosophy from DukeUniversity in 2006, where he is currently a Visiting Scholar in the Philosophy Department.His research interests include philosophy of science (biological and psychologicalsciences) and the life and work of the American philosopher Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985).

Klappentext

Drawing on the work of William Bechtel and RonaldGiere, the book outlines an interpretive framework for the study ofthe sciences based on mechanisms and models rather than laws. Thefirst part looks at the history of mathematics and mechanisticexplanation, which developed hand in hand in the 17th century andprovided support for the idea that scientific knowledge isepitomized by laws of nature. The second part develops a framework formechanistic explanation that is not based primarily on laws. Thethird part presents a model-based account of scientificexplanation and a naturalized account of reasoning and judgment, inwhich scientists are seen as constructing models that are similar tovarious aspects of the real world rather than discovering universalgeneralizations, or laws of nature, the truth of which can bewarranted by the employment of universal principles of rationalitythat can be justified a priori; and the use of models torepresent the world can only be understood within the context of scientificpractice, in which interests and purposes, as well as empiricalobservations, play a role in determining what models are proposed,