Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance

This book comprises studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. The work as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany. The evidence presented supports the strong shareholder rights perspective. It conflicts with the weak shareholder rights view brought forward in the international literature.

This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany. The evidence presented supports the strong shareholder rights perspective. It conflicts with the weak shareholder rights view brought forward in the international literature.

Autorentext

Christian Thamm earned a degree in business law completing his thesis on the Mannesmann trial. He also earned a business degree in finance with his second thesis investigating reasons for the failed takeover of ProSiebenSat.1 Media by Axel Springer. At Technische Universität Darmstadt the author was research assistant at the Chair of Corporate Finance.

Inhalt

Contents: Empirical analysis of minority shareholder activism in Germany Event study on activist events between 1999 and 2011 Abnormal returns are linked to supervisory board election Value creation through minority shareholder monitoring Strong shareholder rights perspective.