Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

First book devoted to monotonicity-related properties of voting rules Provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates Reveals the dilemma of non-motonotic procedures as a basis for elections Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext
Dan Felsenthal is emeritus professor of political science at the University of Haifa. Currently he is also Research Associate at the Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science. His main research areas are measurement of voting power, voting theory and voting behavior, social choice theory, and various applications of game theory to politics. He has published many papers on these subjects as well as two books: Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation (New York: Praeger, 1990), and (jointly with Moshé Machover) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1998). In addition, he edited (jointly with Moshé Machover) the book Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2012). Email: msdanfl@mail.huji.ac.ilHannu Nurmi was the Associate Professor of Methodology of Social Sciences in University of Turku 1974 - 1995. Thereafter he became the chair holder of Political Science in the same university until his retirement in 2012.During the academic year 1972-73 he was a Fulbright-Hayes Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University. In 1978 Nurmi held a British Academy Wolfson Fellowship at University of Essex and from 1991 till 1996 he was the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences in University of Turku. In 1998 he was a Visiting Professor at University of Minnesota. Nurmi was nominated the Academy Professor of Academy of Finland for the period 2003-2008. He is a member of Academia Scientiarum Fennica (the Finnish Academy of Sciences and Letters) from 1982. From 2008 till 2011 he was the Director of Centre of Excellence in Public Choice Research of University of Turku. From 2012 he is Professor Emeritus in the same university. Nurmi's research interests include the theory of voting and electoral systems, applied game theory and causal modeling. List of scientic publications: http://users.utu./hnurmi/homepage/webpub.pdf/

Inhalt
Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview.- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed.- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules.- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates.- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates.- Practical Significance and Open Problems.