Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of China's Nuclear Doctrine

This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational doctrine. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the book explains why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not debate a clear operational doctrine with respect to targeting and employment until the mid-1980s.

Addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear doctrine Explains why China's operational doctrine was not formulated for thirty years after the start of their nuclear programme Contributes to the development of a neoclassical realist approach to the study of international relations by demonstrating its utility in explaining the formation of a state's military doctrine

Autorentext
Paolo Rosa is Professor of Political Science at the School of International Studies of the University of Trento, Italy. He is an associate of the EU Non-proliferation Consortium. His main research interests include Foreign Policy Analysis, Italian Foreign and Military Behaviour, Chinese Politics, Strategic Culture, Quantitative Analysis of Conflicts, and Peace Research.

Inhalt

1. Introduction: Competing explanations for the underdevelopment of China's nuclear doctrine.- 2. A neoclassical realist approach to military doctrines.- 3. China's nuclear programme: Origins and progress.- 4. Nuclear doctrine as a continuation of factional politics by other means, 1964-1971.- 5. Elite stability and nuclear doctrine formulation, 1978-1989.- 6. Conclusions.