Normative Plurality in International Law

This book provides a theoretical framework for explaining the choices made by international decision-makers in terms of what constitutes law. It comprehensively analyzes the practice of human rights courts in applying legal instruments outside their competence and proposes that this practice recognizes that different normative instruments coexist in an un-ordered space, and that meaning can be produced by the free interaction of those instruments around a problem. Based on this, the book advances its normative plurality hypothesis, which states that decision-makers must survey the acquis of international law in order to identify all the instruments containing relevant normative information for a particular situation. The set of rules of law applicable to the situation must then be complemented with other instruments containing specific normative information relevant to the situation, resulting in a complete system of norms advancing a common purpose.

Is the first to comprehensively analyze the practice of human rights courts in applying legal instruments outside their competence Provides a theoretical framework for explaining the choices made by international decision-makers in terms of what constitutes law Presents the problem of sources of international law from the point of view of Scandinavian realism Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Inhalt

Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. Talking About Sources: The Constant Reliance on a Non-Objectified Element.- Chapter 3. The Imperfect Paradigm: Article 38 of The Statute Of The International Court Of Justice.- Chapter 4. Human Rights as a New Paradigm.- Chapter 5. Normative Plurality in International Law.- Chapter 6. General Conclusion.