Nuclear Terrorism and Rational Choice

The prospect of nuclear terrorism, terrorist acts with nuclear fission explosives, is analysed by means of rational choice theory, a methodology borrowed from economics which has hitherto not been systematically applied to nuclear terrorism. Four relevant decision situations are studied: The terrorist's choice of whether to embark on an ambitious and expensive nuclear project or to stay with tried and trusted conventional methods; The choice of fissile material for a terrorist bent on building a nuclear weapon; The government's choice of prioritising between branches of fissile materials security; and the strategic interplay between terrorist and government in the case where the terrorist has acquired a nuclear weapon and must decide whether to use it to attack, for extortion, or to deter an attack upon his own interests. In each case, the methodology of modelling allows a number of key conclusions to be drawn, informing policy makers on best responses to a threat which is notoriously difficult to estimate.

Autorentext

Ellingsen holds a PhD in War Studies from King's College London, and a MSc and a PhD in physics from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). He is author of more than 30 research papers and awardee of the Royal Norwegian Society's prize to young researchers. He is currently postdoc at Energy and Process Engineering, NTNU.