Overconfidence and Risk Taking in Foreign Policy Decision Making

This book introduces a new perspective on risk seeking behaviour, developing a framework based on various cognitive theories, and applying it to the specific case-study of Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria. The author examines why policy makers commit themselves to polices that they do not have the capacity to deliver, and develops an alternative theoretical model to prospect theory in explaining risk taking behaviour based on the concept of overconfidence. The volume suggests that overconfident individuals exhibit risk seeking behaviour that contradicts the risk averse behaviour of individuals in the domain of gain, as predicted by prospect theory. Using a set of testable hypothesis deduced from the model, it presents an empirical investigation of the causes behind Turkish decision makers' unprecedented level of risk taking toward the uprising in Syria and the consequences of this policy.

Offers a unique perspective on decision making in foreign policy, focusing on patterns of risk taking that deviate from generally risk averse decision makers Focuses on a particularly timely and relevant case-study: Turkish foreign policy towards Syria Challenges prospect theory and offers a new model of risk taking that takes into account the unique challenges of overconfidence

Autorentext
Imran Demir is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations in the School of Political Science, Marmara University, Turkey. He earned his PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri, USA, and holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey.

Inhalt

1. Introduction .- 2. The Relevant Literature on Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking .- 3. Modeling the Relationship between Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking .- 4. The Turkish Policy to Remove Syrian President Assad: Overconfidence Obscures Risks and Magnifies Failure .- 5. Why Turkish Overconfidence Was Too Obvious .- 6. Conclusion.