Price Level Regulation for Diversified Public Utilities

Autorentext
Ronald R. Braeutigam is the Harvey Kapnick Professor of Business Institutions in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University. He is Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences. He received a BS in Petroleum Engineering from the University of Tulsa in 1970 and then attended Stanford University and the California Institute of Technology, and he has also held an appointment as a Senior Research Fellow at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Science Center Berlin). He has also worked in both government and industry, beginning his career as a petroleum engineer with Standard Oil of Indiana (now BP), serving as research economist in The White House office of Telecommunications Policy, and as an economic consultant to Congress, many government agencies and private firms on matters of pricing, costing, managerial strategy, antitrust, and regulation.

Inhalt
and Statement of Purpose.- 1 The Inefficacy of Profit Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. An Economic Overview.- B. A Legal Overview.- 2 The Welfare Ingredients of Price Level Regulation: Incentives and Decisional Options.- A. The Firm's Incentives and their Welfare Implications.- B. Major Decisional Issues in a Price Level Regime.- 3 Assessing the Efficacy of Price Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. Potential Benefits of Price Level Regulation.- B. Potential Problems of Price Level Regulation.- 4 Implementing a Price Level Regime for Diversified Public Utilities.- A. As Applied to the Firm's Natural Monopoly Markets.- B. As Applied to Relationships between the Diversified Firm's Regulated and Unregulated Markets.- Conclusion.- Endnotes.- Afterword.