Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy

This book argues that while the US president makes foreign policy decisions based largely on political pressures, it is concentrated interests that shape the incentive structures in which he and other top officials operate.

Autorentext

Richard Hanania is the President of the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and a Research Fellow at Defense Priorities. He was formerly a Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, received his PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles, and is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. Richard has published academic works that contribute to the studies of American foreign policy, international law, political psychology, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, and civil war.

Inhalt

Introduction Chapter 1 American Grand Strategy and the Unitary Actor Model Chapter 2 The Public Choice Model of Foreign Policy Chapter 3 The Rogue Superpower Chapter 4 Build, then Balance: The United States and Its Rivals Chapter 5 American Sanctions: Ineffective, Immoral, and Politically Convenient Chapter 6 The War on Terror from the Public Choice Perspective Conclusion: Understanding and Changing American Foreign Policy