Regulation and Instability in U.S. Commercial Banking

The historical response to bank crises has always been more regulation. A pattern emerges that some may find surprising: regulation often contributes to bank instability. It suppresses competition and effective response to market changes and encourages bankers to take on additional risk. This book offers a valuable history lesson for policy makers.

Autorentext
JILL M. HENDRICKSON Visiting Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, USA. Previously, she held the Frank Wilson Endowed Chair of Political Economy at the University of the South, USA. She has published her research on banking regulation in The Journal of Economic History , and The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance , among other journals.

Inhalt
Commercial Bank Instability Theories of Bank Regulation Antebellum Banking: 1781-1863 National Banking Era: 1864-1912 Era of Instability and Change: 1913-1944 Postwar Banking Era and Regulatory Response: 1945-1999 Banking and Crisis in the Twenty-First Century: 2000-2010 Lessons From the History of U.S. Banking and Regulation