Relational Passage of Time

This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. It argues that the B-theory of time-and its close affiliate, the eternalist-relativistic account of time-does not predicate an utterly static view of reality.

This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. The realist view of passage developed in this book differs from the robust, substantivalist position. According to relationism, passage is nothing over and above the succession of events, one thing coming after another. Causally related events are temporally arranged as they happen one after another along observers' worldlines. There is no unique global passage but a multiplicity of local passages of time. After setting out this positive argument for relationism, the author deals with five common objections to it: (a) triviality of deflationary passage, (b) a-directionality of passage, (c) the impossibility of experiencing passage, (d) fictionalism about passage, and (e) the incompatibility of passage with perduring objects.

*Relational Passage of Time* will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of time, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics.

Autorentext

Matias Slavov is an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Fellow at Tampere University, Finland. He is the author of Hume's Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science (2020).

Inhalt

Preface

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I. The positive argument

Chapter 1. Relational, not substantial passage

Part II. Answering objections

Chapter 1. Relational passage is neither trivial nor question-begging

Chapter 2. Passage is directed

Chapter 3. We experience and misconceive passage

Chapter 4. Passage is not a fiction

Chapter 5. Time passes amidst perduring objects

Conclusion: Final thoughts