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Relevance Theory meets Markedness
Details
Rising influence of cognitive sciences on linguistics has been observed recently. This work aims at pointing out which role cognitive effort may play in natural language processing. From a pragmatic perspective various approaches to a plausible definition of cognitive effort are presented. Some introductory sections to pragmatics lead to a discussion on relevance theory. Also, a variety of markedness concepts are introduced. These are examined in regard to their utility for the description of context understood as a psychological construct. Finally, a natural language processing model is used to describe cognitive effort in the light of divers learning models.
Autorentext
The Author: Peter Schuster was born in 1967 in Heilbronn/Germany. He studied Linguistics and Business Administration at Stuttgart University where he graduated in November 1997. For his M.A. thesis he taped and transcribed spoken language in a British office in order to analyse the communicative functions and meanings of the word `right in relation to its position in the utterance.
Inhalt
Contents: Introduction to markedness The pragmatic perspective Reflections on relevance theory Cognitive markedness.
Weitere Informationen
- Allgemeine Informationen
- Sprache Englisch
- Titel Relevance Theory meets Markedness
- Veröffentlichung 18.03.2003
- ISBN 363138968X
- Format Kartonierter Einband
- EAN 9783631389683
- Jahr 2003
- Größe H210mm x B148mm x T14mm
- Autor Peter Schuster
- Untertitel Considerations on Cognitive Effort as a Criterion for Markedness in Pragmatics
- Gewicht 326g
- Auflage 1. Auflage
- Features Dissertationsschrift
- Genre Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaften
- Lesemotiv Verstehen
- Anzahl Seiten 248
- Herausgeber Peter Lang
- GTIN 09783631389683